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I. Introduction
In May 1958, Professor Pieter Sanders, a scholar from the
Netherlands, sat down at a small portable typewriter in a leafy
Connecticut garden at the home of his father-in-law.' Over a
t Associate Professor and Ackerman Scholar, University of Connecticut. My thanks to
Yan Li for providing helpful research assistance.
I See Stavros Brekoulakis, Enforcement ofForeign Arbitral Awards: Observations
on the Efficiency of the Current System and the Gradual Development of Alternative
Means of Enforcement, 19 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 415, 415 (2008); J. William Rowley,
Remarks on 'Pieter Sanders at 95: Reflections on the New York Convention,' 2 DiSp.
RESOL. INT'L 13, 16 (2008). Pieter Sanders remembers, "I can still see myself sitting in
the garden with my small portable typewriter on my knees. It was there, sitting in the
sun, that the [forerunner to the New York Convention] was conceived." Pieter Sanders,
The Making of the Convention, in UNITED NATIONS, ENFORCING ARBITRATION AWARDS
UNDER THE NEW YORK CONVENTION: EXPERIENCE AND PROSPECTS 3, 3 (1999), available
at http://www.newyorkconvention.org/new-york-convention/history.
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weekend, he crafted a proposal that was presented to the United
Nations Conference on International Commercial Arbitration, held
the next Monday.2 That modestly drafted document evolved into
the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, now known as the New
York Convention ("Convention").' Professor Sanders could not
have foreseen that his modestly drafted proposal would be signed
by over 140 nations and would become one of the most successful
conventions in the history of international law.4 Today, the
Convention is considered to be a veritable constitutional charter
for international arbitration and is the most important international
legal instrument in its field.'
Arbitration is a private system of adjudicating disputes through
a neutral professional known as an arbitrator.6 The seemingly
simple concept resolves disagreements in a fashion that is superior
in many ways to commercial litigation. Arbitration is faster and
cheaper.' The process is flexible to meet parties' needs, is
confidentially administered by experts in the field, and delivers
resolutions to disputes that are both complete and final.'
2 See Brekoulakis, supra note 1, at 415.
3 See United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 [hereinafter New York
Convention].
4 See Brekoulakis, supra note 1, at 415-16. Pieter Sanders is now known as the
father of international commercial arbitration. For a charming interview of Professor
Sanders, now living well into his ninth decade, see Reflections on the New York
Convention Video, INT'L COUNCIL FOR COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION,
http://www.arbitration-icca.org/officers-and-members/honorary-
presidents/PieterSanders.html (last visited Apr. 4, 2012).
5 See GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 92-93 (2009).
6 See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 42 (3d pocket ed. 2006).
7 See Edna Sussman, Why Arbitrate? The Benefits and Savings, 1899 PLI/CORP
257, 259-60 (2011).
8 See id.; see also Rebecca Fett, Forum Selection for Resolution of Foreign
Investment Disputes in China, 62 DisP. RESOL. J. 73, 77 (2007) ("[S]ince arbitration
allows the parties to select an arbitrator with specific expertise relevant to the dispute, an
arbitrator is still more likely to have a better understanding of the dispute than a judge.");
W. Michael Reisman & Heide Iravani, Conflict and Cooperation: The Changing
Relation of National Courts and International Commerical Arbitration, 21 AM. REV.
INT'L ARB. 5, 36 (2010) ("A critical strut of the architecture of international commercial
arbitration is the guarantee of the finality of arbitral awards once they are issued . . . .");
R. Michael Rogers & John P. Palmer, A Speaking Analysis of ADR Legislation for the
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That is what international arbitration should typically
accomplish. Yet, situations do exist where a second forum can
interfere with resolution of the arbitration in the primary
jurisdiction, thus disabling the smooth functioning of the arbitral
process. One such situation is the enforcement of annulled
arbitration awards, which is a focus of this article. Enforcement of
annulled arbitration awards typically occurs when an arbitrator
issues an award, the court annuls the award for a certain reason,
and then a court in another jurisdiction decides to enforce the
previously-annulled award.' Such a practice has been viewed with
consternation by international firms which anticipate the arbitral
forum to be the final locale of resolution of any commercial
disputes."o
The enforcement of annulled arbitration awards appears to be a
narrow, almost picayune, topic hardly worth more than a passing
reference in the arbitration literature. Despite the seemingly
limited potential for such a topic to raise ire, the disagreement
between writers on this issue has, at times, been sharp and
passionate. A single court decision on the topic, for example, can
attract lavish praise from one author and withering critique from
another." Whether through judicial disagreement or scholarly
flourish, enforcement of annulled arbitral awards has been, and
remains, an aggressively debated issue.12
Divorce Neutral, 31 ST. MARY'S L.J. 871, 900 (2000) ("If an arbitrator has expertise and
an abiding interest in the subject, he may be a better decisionmaker than the local judicial
alternative."). But see Gary Minda, Arbitration in the Post-Cold-War Era: Justice
Kennedy's View ofPostexpiration Arbitratability in Litton Financial Printing Division v.
NLRB, 22 STETSON L. REV. 83, 90 n.24 (1992) ("Issues of contractual intent have always
been the grist of judges because judges, not arbitrators, have presumably superior
expertise in determining legally enforceable obligations under contract.").
9 See Reisman & Iravani, supra note 8, at 7-10.
10 See id. at 16.
11 See infra text accompanying notes 151-57 (noting this sharp division).
12 The issue may arguably have been receiving too much attention, a veritable
scholarly red herring. See Roger P. Alford, The American Influence on International
Arbitration, 10 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 69, 69 (2003) ("Why embark on treacherous
waters to face the fractures within [the arbitration community] when we could remain
anchored in the safe harbor of yet another discussion of Chromalloy and Hilmarton?").
"Chromalloy" and "Hilmarton" are common parlance for two leading cases that address
the topic of the enforcement of annulled awards and will be discussed in more depth later
in this article. See infra text accompanying notes 106, 162.
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In U.S. law reviews, debate over the propriety of enforcing
vacated international arbitration awards has centered on a quartet
of federal court cases that have directly addressed this issue.
Chromalloy Aeroservices v. Arab Republic of Egypt," decided
first, enforced an annulled award.14 Chromalloy's main judicial
rival is TermoRio S.A. E.S.P. v. Electranta S.P.," which declined
to enforce an annulled award.'" The remaining pair, Baker Marine
(Nig.) Ltd. v. Chevron (Nig.) Ltd." and Spier v. Calzaturificio
Tecnica S.p.A.,' also declined to enforce an annulled award when
requested to do so.' 9 Furthermore, a number of foreign
jurisdictions exist where post-annulment enforcement has either
occurred in the past, is wholly embraced today, or has the potential
to happen in the future due to the structure of existing national
law. 20
The purpose of this article is to examine the current treatment
of enforcement of annulled arbitration awards with the goal of not
simply adding to the debate by siding with one court over another
but seeking a stable and uniform solution that would be widely
acceptable across national jurisdictions. Part II examines the
benefits of international commercial arbitration to businesses and
briefly describes the history and development of the Convention.
Part III explores the judicial divide surrounding enforcement of
annulled awards. This Part shows how an ambiguously written
13 939 F. Supp. 907 (D.D.C. 1996).
14 See id. at 908, 914-15.
15 487 F.3d 928 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
16 Though to be precise, TermoRio did not explicitly condemn Chromalloy, but
rather interpreted its holding so as to, in effect, narrow any future precedential impact
that Chromalloy might have. See Linda Silberman, The New York Convention After Fifty
Years: Some Reflections on the Role of National Law, 38 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 25, 31
n.26 (2009) ("The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in TermoRio did not
overrule Chromalloy, but distinguished it on various grounds, including the fact that all
the connections in TermoRio were with Colombia (Colombian parties, Colombian seat,
and Colombian law), and that there was no finality clause precluding judicial review as
there was in Chromalloy.").
17 191 F.3d 194 (2d Cir. 1999).
18 77 F. Supp. 2d 405 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
19 See id. at 408; Baker Marine, 191 F.3d at 198.
20 See Winston Stromberg, Avoiding the Full Court Press: International
Commercial Arbitration and Other Global Dispute Resolution Processes, 40 Loy. L.A.
L. REv. 1337, 1390-93 (2007).
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Convention provision has enabled courts to take different
perspectives on the appropriate scope of enforcement of annulled
arbitration awards. Part IV evaluates one of the pending solutions
to the ambiguous language problem, a revision of the Convention
proposed by leading arbitration expert Albert Jan van den Berg.
While the proposed revision has attracted criticism, this Part offers
a defense of the proposed regime. This Part shows that the
proposed revision offers the current best hope for resolving current
structural limitations in the now-aging Convention, and it is
especially relevant in resolving the continuing conflict over the
enforcement of annulled awards.
II. International Commercial Arbitration and the
Convention
A. The Benefits of International Commercial Arbitration
The value of domestic arbitration to commercial enterprises is
well understood in the literature. Scholars rightly hail arbitration
as a cheaper, quicker, and more flexible alternative to courtroom
litigation.2' Courts generally agree.2 2 A variety of debates exist
over the appropriate scope of domestic arbitration, the
appropriateness of consumer participation in arbitration being one
example.23 However, scholarly consensus regarding the benefits
21 See, e.g., Joseph L. Daly & Suzanne M. Scheller, Strengthening Arbitration by
Facing its Challenges, 28 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 67, 67 (2009) ("The purpose of arbitration
is to provide quick, efficient, and inexpensive resolution of disputes."). Arbitration is of
course not without criticism. E.g., Thomas J. Stipanowich, Arbitration: The "New
Litigation", 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 5 ("Despite repeated evidence that business lawyers
tend to view arbitration more favorably than litigation in key categories (fairness, speed
to resolution, and cost), the literature frequently focuses on various perceived
shortcomings, including unqualified arbitrators, uneven administration, difficulties with
arbitrator compromise, and limited appeal. There are, moreover, frequent complaints
regarding delay and high cost.").
22 See, e.g., Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S.
614, 628 (1985) (describing arbitration as simple, informal, and expeditious relative to
courtroom litigation); Gray HoldCo Inc. v. Cassidy, 654 F.3d 444, 459 (3d Cir. 2011)
("[A]rbitration is meant to streamline the proceedings, lower costs, and conserve private
and judicial resources .... ); Prod. & Maint. Employees' Local 504, Laborers' Intern.
Union of N. Am., AFL-CIO v. Roadmaster Corp., 916 F.2d 1161, 1163 (7th Cir. 1990)
("Arbitration clauses are agreements to move cases out of court, to simplify dispute
resolution, making it quick and cheap.").
23 E.g., R. Wilson Freyermuth, Foreclosure by Arbitration, 37 PEPP. L. REV. 459
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of business-to-business arbitration, including primacy of price,
time, and flexibility, remains largely intact.2 4
This consensus, certainly appropriate in domestic arbitration,
is not characteristic of the international commercial setting.
International arbitration is costly; it is so expensive that, in some
cases, it can be more costly than a trial.25 Arbitration experts must
be paid, and their time is not cheaply given.2 6 Any supervisory
institution that either provides the arbitrator or sets the rules must
also be paid.2 7 By contrast, court fees lack these payments.2 8 In
addition, travel to the site of arbitration, which includes the use of
hotel and rented rooms, is also an expense for at least one, or
perhaps both, parties.29 Finally, certain arbitration proceedings,
such as ad hoc proceedings arranged outside the supervision of an
institutional framework, have been reported to be "frighteningly
expensive."30  Complex cases can increase arbitration costs.
Lengthy written submissions, extensive expert evidence, and long
(2010); Shelley McGill, Consumer Arbitration Clause Enforcement: A Balanced
Legislative Response, 47 AM. Bus. L.J. 361 (2010).
24 E.g., DOUGLAS SHONTZ ET AL., RAND INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, BUSINESS-TO-
BUSINESS ARBITRATION IN THE UNITED STATES: PERCEPTIONS OF CORPORATE COUNSEL iX
(2011) (reporting that a majority of corporate counsel surveyed reporting belief that
"contractual arbitration is better, faster, and cheaper than litigation."); NAT'L
ARBITRATION FORUM, BUSINESS-TO-BUSINESS MEDIATION/ARBITRATION VS. LITIGATION
2 (2005), available at
http://www.adrforum.com/users/naf/resources/GeneralCommercialWP.pdf (citing 1997
study of 1,000 of the largest U.S. corporations which found that ninety percent of
respondents viewed alternative dispute resolution as a "critical cost-control technique"
and seventy-nine percent used arbitration in the last three years).
25 See Jay Lawrence Westbrook, International Arbitration and Multinational
Insolvency, 29 PENN ST. INT'L L. REV. 635, 641 (2011). One analysis of the costs of
international commercial arbitration reveals that eighty-two percent of costs are spent on
legal advisers and parties presenting their cases while only sixteen percent covers
arbitrator costs and two percent goes to the administration of the arbitration procedure.
See NADJA MARIE ALEXANDER, INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE MEDIATION: LEGAL
PERSPECTIVES 41 (2009).
26 See BORN, supra note 5, at 1646-51 (providing a detailed discussion of an
arbitrator's right to payment); Michael Kerr, International Arbitration v. Litigation, 1980
J. Bus. L. 164, 164-65.
27 See BORN, supra note 5, at 85.
28 See Kerr, supra note 26, at 164-65.
29 See BORN, supra note 5, at 85.
30 Richard J. Graving, The International Commercial Arbitration Institutions: How
GoodA Job Are They Doing?, 4 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 319, 368 (1989).
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hearings all give arbitration a quasi-courtroom character, without
the state shouldering the costs of the proceedings." This does not
mean that all arbitration proceedings cost more than courtroom
battles but that under certain conditions, the costs and benefits of
arbitration can be neutralized.
International arbitration is also time-consuming. The process
can drag on for years.32 A once highly malleable instrument,
international arbitration has been imbued with formalized rules in
an effort to harmonize the practice of arbitration across national
institutions.33 This has led one U.K. Lord Justice of Appeal to
lament that inflexible arbitration could devolve into "all the
elephantine laboriousness of an action in court, without the saving
grace of the exasperated judge's power to bang together the heads
of recalcitrant parties[.]" 3 4
Arbitration rules, while creating a sense of orderly process, can
significantly erode the ability of arbitration to reach a prompt
resolution. Overall, commercial disputes can take as long as three
years to reach a final reward." While a three-year resolution
seems rapid when compared to the glacial pace of some
jurisdictions, 36 it might not present a dramatic advantage in those
with more efficient national courts.3 7 One author succinctly
summarizes the supposed cost and time savings in international
arbitration, concluding that "[o]n balance, international arbitration
does not necessarily have either dramatic speed or cost advantages
or disadvantages as compared to national court proceedings. ...
This conclusion is supported by empirical evidence and anecdotal
accounts of users' evaluations of the international arbitral process
31 See BORN, supra note 5, at 85.
32 See Westbrook, supra note 25, at 641.
33 See Stipanowich, supra note 21, at 23.
34 Michael John Mustill, Arbitration: History and Background, 6 J. INT'L ARB. 43,
56(1989).
35 See BORN, supra note 5, at 86.
36 The speed of Indian courts is one well-known example. E.g., Thomas M. Britt
III et al., BRICs Due Diligence: What you Need to Know, 1897 PLI/CORP 35, 52-53
(2011) (stating that an average Indian lawsuit takes fifteen years to resolve); see also
John Armour & Priya Lele, Law, Finance, and Politics: The Case of India, 43 LAW &
Soc'Y REV. 491, 510 (2009) (reporting ten year delay as typical).
37 See BORN, supra note 5, at 84-86.
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and its advantages.""
If arbitration does not consistently deliver time or cost
advantages, then why do international parties participate in
arbitration so readily? For global firms, arbitration is not simply
an efficiency tool, but a way to manage legal risk." Legal risk
management is the process of gathering knowledge about legal
risks, assessing the costs of such risks, and making efficient
decisions within an ambiguous legal environment.4 0 Firms know
that contractual disputes are an inevitable part of doing business,
and arbitration is one way of managing that risk.
While domestic companies face dispute resolution risk, for
global firms, the exposure to that risk is amplified because of the
potential influence of multiple jurisdictions. For example, in
domestic arbitration, the judicial interaction with arbitration
proceedings can vary across U.S. states and circuits.4 1 Such
variance, however, is relatively small when compared to the great
differences between arbitration laws and climates across national
borders.42 in some countries judicial bias is a problem; in others, it
is not.43 In some countries, courts are willing, almost eager, to
intervene in international arbitration proceedings and enforcement,
but in others, courts are not.44 The legal policy of national courts
38 Id. at 86.
39 See John F. Coyle, Rethinking the Commercial Law Treaty, 45 GA. L. REv. 343,
404 (2011) (noting that arbitration treaties enable firms to mitigate legal risk, forum risk,
and enforcement risk).
40 See Risk Management Law & Legal Definition, US
LEGAL, http://definitions.uslegal.com/r/risk-management/ (last visited Apr. 4, 2012).
41 See Richard A. Bales, The Laissez-Faire Arbitration Market and the Need for a
Uniform Federal Standard Governing Employment and Consumer Arbitration, 52 KAN.
L. REV. 583, 625-26 (2004) (noting that judicial approaches to arbitration enforcement
vary across states due to differences in state contract laws).
42 See, e.g., Stromberg, supra note 20, at 1371 ("The legal principles for vacating
international arbitration awards are expressed in the national laws of the territory where
the award is made. As national arbitration laws set forth varying grounds on which
arbitration awards can be annulled, attorneys need to be familiar with different
approaches across the globe."). The Convention permits vacatur of awards, for example,
under local law. See New York Convention, supra note 3, art. V(1)(e) (permitting court
vacatur of awards in the nation "under the law of which [the] award was made").
43 See Stromberg, supra note 20, at 1392.
44 One example of such engagement is the conduct of French courts, as exemplified
in the Hilmarton decision, discussed infra text accompanying notes 161-78, 201. Rafael
Villar Gagliardi and C6sar Rossi Machado have written a positive review of one court
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and the site of arbitration can have a significant impact on the
costs, and even the outcome, of the proceeding.
This wide legal variance means that international commercial
firms perceive arbitration differently. For example, some
domestic scholars lament that arbitration is becoming increasingly
formalized with greater use of judicial-style rules and discovery
methods that resemble courtroom litigation.4 5 The problem with
such formalization is that it dilutes the very cost and time benefits
that arbitration proceedings were designed to deliver.4 6
From the international commercial perspective, however, the
formalization of the arbitration process may be seen as an
advantage of arbitration rather than a weakness. Formalization
serves to mitigate the legal risk that firms face litigating in foreign
tribunals.4 7 Arbitration avoids the idiosyncratic and unexpected
local traditions that contravene accepted and predictable practices
in international dispute settlements.4 8 Avoiding such variance-
system in the advanced developing world. See Rafael Villar Gagliardi & C6sar Rossi
Machado, Highlights of Arbitration Developments in Brazil, 16 IBA ARB. NEWS 112,
114 (2011) ("[T]he judiciary has shown tremendous respect for the central and important
concept of arbitration as a private contractual matter. Much is still to be done, but the
progress achieved is noteworthy and is a development about which the Brazilian
arbitration community can be proud, and in which the international arbitration
community can trust.").
45 See Larry J. Pittman, Mandatory Arbitration: Due Process and Other
Constitutional Concerns, 39 CAP. U. L. REV. 853, 889 (2011).
46 See id. ("[A]rbitration itself is increasingly becoming more costly and protracted
as it mimics court adjudication."); Kenneth M. Kramer, JAMS' Expedited Rules:
Returning Arbitration to Its Roots, 28 ALT. TO HIGH COST LITIG. 191, 191 (2010) ("Now
... there appears to be a growing consensus that the benefits of arbitration have been
squandered and that the arbitration of today does not provide the benefits of speed,
efficiency and cost control."). The source of this effect has been attributed to both
lawyers and litigants. See Robert F. Copple, 48 ARIZ. ATT'Y 44, 45-56 (2011)
("[B]ecause of litigant demands (or assumptions) of the same formal procedures that
have slowed and encumbered litigation in the courts . . . arbitration has become
increasingly judicialized and, as a result, less efficient and more costly. . . . [I]n many
circumstances, arbitration has become a mirror image of a full blown judicial trial.");
William C. Smith, Much to Do About ADR, 86 A.B.A. J. 62, 63 (2000) ("[L]awyers have
put their indelible mark on ADR. Arbitration, mediation and other ADR mechanisms
now entail more rules, more delay, and more expense-precisely the headaches that
ADR was designed to avoid.").
47 See Darlene S. Wood, International Arbitration and Punitive Damages:
Delocalization and Mandatory Rules, 71 DEF. CouNs. J. 402, 406 (2004).
48 See id. ("Lex mercatoria and international commercial arbitration form a match
1021
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and the confounding associated risk-is an important reason
global firms avoid courts and choose arbitration and its forum-
selecting qualities as its international dispute resolution process. 49
Thus, international litigants may avoid a courtroom not
because of a court's complex, costly, and formal rules but rather in
spite of such rules. A strength of international arbitration is that it
is, indeed, formal, and it will produce a similar result as litigation
without unfair judicial interference."o International arbitration can
be perceived as a risk-mitigating substitute, rather than simply as
an alternative to national court litigation."
In addition, international commercial arbitration has inherent
characteristics that potentially make it preferable to court
resolution. These characteristics are important not because
academics affirm them as such but because firms who participate
in arbitration cite them as beneficial.52 First, one of the most
important benefits of arbitration is to provide a neutral forum for
resolving disputes.5 3 A neutral forum is one that is free from the
influence of either party.54 In other words, no company involved
in the dispute can use the site of the dispute resolution process to
exert undue advantage over the other.
Neutrality begins with the arbitrator himself or herself. An
arbitrator is, at least in theory, detached from national jurisdictions
and obligations. 5 Often provided by an established supervisory
organization, the arbitrator is widely expected to apply his or her
expertise objectively.5 ' Beyond the proceedings, undue advantage
made in heaven, in that parties seek to use both of these tools for the same reasons: to
escape local traditions and biases encountered in national courts.").
49 See Christopher R. Drahozal, Commercial Norms, Commercial Codes, and
International Commercial Arbitration, 33 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 79, 95 (2000)
[hereinafter Drahozal, Commercial Norms] (citing William W. Park, Arbitration Avoids
'Hometown Justice' Overseas, NAT'L L.J., May 4, 1998, at Cl8).
50 See Yves Dezaley & Bryant Garth, Fussing About the Forum: Categories and
Definitions as Stakes in a Professional Competition, 21 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 285, 299
(1996).
51 See Drahozal, Commercial Norms, supra note 49, at 95.
52 See id.
53 See id.
54 See id.
55 See id
56 Arbitrators, however, are loosely regulated compared to their judicial
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can arise from one firm's knowledge of the idiosyncrasies of a
particular forum and the associated conveniences of nearby clients
and counsel." Local courts in one party's principal place of
business may also convey an advantage to the local party through
favorable juries and rules." National courts can also impose a
kind of "hometown justice," whereby judges apply their biases in
favor of local firms at the expense of foreign litigants.5 9 They may
also convey the implication that an award against a local firm can
result in lost jobs and stunted economic growth for the local
population. Courts may be so infected with bias that firms might
even use international arbitration to escape their own judiciary."o
As one diarist scribed in 1831, "[there] is little use in going to law
counterparts. See Catherine A. Rogers, Regulating International Arbitrators: A
Functional Approach to Developing Standards of Conduct, 41 STAN. J. INT'L L. 53
(2005); Olga K. Byrne, Note, A New Code of Ethics for Commercial Arbitrators: The
Neutrality of Party-Appointed Arbitrators on a Tripartite Panel, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
1815, 1835 (2003).
57 See, e.g., Gary B. Born, Keynote Address: Arbitration and the Freedom to
Associate, 38 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 7, 14 (2009) ("When . . . parties conclude a
commercial contract, neither is particularly receptive to the prospective of litigation in its
counter-party's home courts. These concerns are often rooted in sound concerns about
the neutrality of local courts in international disputes."); Ya-Wei Li, Dispute Resolution
Clauses In International Contracts: An Empirical Study, 39 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 789, 790
(2006) ("[U]nderstanding the language of foreign courts and navigating their complex
procedural laws are anathema to many American businesses and their lawyers.").
58 SAM LUTTRELL, BIAS CHALLENGES IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION: THE NEED FOR A 'REAL DANGER' TEST 3 (2009) ("From the international
businessperson's perspective, the most significant risk is that judges in other states may
be biased against foreign parties.").
59 Drahozal, Commercial Norms, supra note 49, at 95 ("The principal reason
parties choose to arbitrate international commercial disputes is . . . the desire to avoid
'hometown justice'. . . ."); see also MARIEL DIMSEY, THE RESOLUTION OF
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT DISPUTES: CHALLENGES AND SOLUTIONS 224 (2008)
("[O]ne of the original reasons for distancing investment dispute resolution from national
courts was the inevitable and unavoidable perception of bias that would arise if states
were subjected to the courts of their own system."); GEORGIOS I. ZEKOS, INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL AND MARINE ARBITRATION 36 (2008) ("[T]he main reason parties choose to
arbitrate international commercial disputes is because neither party is comfortable
litigating in the public courts of the other's home country.").
60 Symposium, The Florida-Mexico Tomato Conflict: What Has Happened and
Where Might It Go From Here?, II FLA. J. INT'L L. 233, 284 (1997) (quoting Professor
Michael Gordon, "when you ask Mexicans what is the most important reason for
arbitration, it is not speed or cost, but to keep things out of the Mexican judicial
system.").
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with the devil when the court is held in hell."6 1
Surveys bear out this business preference. For example,
according to one survey, seventy percent of respondents reported
that the neutrality of the forum was "highly relevant" in deciding
whether to choose arbitration to resolve global disputes.6 2 In
another, neutrality and impartiality were important reasons for
parties to select a particular place to resolve arbitral disputes.6 3
Thus, global firms are not simply looking for a cheaper or simpler
forum but a neutral one that is free from unwarranted judicial
interference, a characteristic .that domestic litigants may take for
granted.
Other characteristics of arbitration are also relevant to
organizations. Arbitration awards are more readily enforceable
than litigation awards.64  Arbitration also provides a single,
centralized forum to resolve disputes that circumvent jurisdictional
and choice of law issues that plague international litigation.65
Another advantage is the rapid enforceability of arbitration
awards. A corporate survey reports that most corporations can
enforce an arbitral award within one year's time, potentially much
quicker than collecting on a court judgment.66 Further, party
flexibility and autonomy are also factors, enabling firms to decide
how, where, and by whom disputes will be resolved.6 7 This helps
61 HUMPHREY O'SULLIVAN, THE DIARY OF HUMPHREY O'SULLIVAN 100 (1827-35)
(Tomas de Bhaldraithe trans., Mercer Press. 1979).
62 Drahozal, Commercial Norms, supra note 49, at 95 n.83 (citing CHRISTIAN
BUHRING-UHLE, ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS app. 1, 395
(1996)).
63 See WHITE & CASE, 2010 INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION SURVEY: CHOICES IN
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 18, available at
http://www.arbitrationonline.org/docs/201 0_IntemationalArbitrationSurveyReport.pdf.
64 Drahozal, Commercial Norms, supra note 49, at 95.
65 BORN, supra note 5, at 74.
66 PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: CORPORATE
ATTITUDES AND PRACTICES 3 (2008), available at
http://www.pwc.co.uklen-uk/uk/assets/pdf/pwe-international-arbitration-2008.pdf.
67 Edward Ti Seng Wei, Why Egregious Errors of Law May Yet Justify a Refusal of
Enforcement Under the New York Convention, 2009 SING. J. LEGAL STUD. 592, 593
(2009); see also Leon E. Trakman, The Twenty-First Century Law Merchant, 48 AM.
Bus. L.J. 775, 822 (2011) ("[T]wenty-first-century merchants exercise an ever-widening
sphere of individual autonomy in choosing the form, substance, and process of
transnational arbitration to regulate their disputes.").
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insulate the proceedings from external political and social
considerations.6 8 Parties also benefit from the confidentiality that
arbitrations typically provide, something that judicial proceedings
rarely offer to litigants.6 9  Finally, arbitration may encourage
settlement, as the dispute resolution environment is inherently
more amicable than litigation and provides a more open forum to
discuss settlements during the process. As one author rightly
summarizes, "[I]nternational arbitration is much like democracy; it
is nowhere close to ideal, and often fails to fully realize its
objectives, but it is generally a good deal better than the available
alternatives."o
B. The Convention: A BriefHistory
Although Professor Sanders' weekend craftsmanship was
certainly a critical innovation," other groups, including
businesses, played an important role in the Convention's
development. The first draft of what became the Convention was
actually drafted by the International Chamber of Commerce
("ICC"), a trade organization founded in 1919 that represented
firms' interest in the global economy.72 The ICC noted the
weaknesses of the regime then in place, the Geneva Convention
for the Execution of Foreign Arbitral Awards of 1927 ("Geneva
Convention"). While the Geneva Convention was a considerable
68 Wei, supra note 67, at 593-94.
69 For a discussion on the need for greater openness, see Catherine A. Rogers,
Transparency in International Commercial Arbitration, 54 U. KAN. L. REV. 1301 (2006).
70 BORN, supra note 5, at 90.
71 See supra text accompanying notes 1-5. Professor Sanders demurred at such
praise. When a professor called his draft a "a very bold innovation," Professor Sanders
responded simply regarding his effort as a mere "logical follow-up to the Geneva
Convention of 1927, taking into account the experience gained since then in the
increased use of arbitration." Pieter Sanders, The History of the New York Convention, in
IMPROVING THE EFFICIENCY OF ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS AND AWARDS: 40 YEARS OF
APPLICATION OF THE NEW YORK CONVENTION 11, 12 (Albert van den Berg, ed. 1999).
72 Richard A. Hulbert, The Case for a Coherent Application of Chapter 2 of the
Federal Arbitration Act, 22 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 45, 52 (2011) (citing Report and
Preliminary Draft Convention adopted by the Committee on International Commercial
Arbitration at its meeting of March 13, 1953, reprinted in 9(1) ICC INT'L CT. ARB. BULL.
32, 35 (May 1998)). See also What is ICC?, INT'L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE,
http://www.iccwbo.org/id93/index.html (last visited Apr. 4, 2012).
73 BORN, supra note 5, at 93.
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improvement over prior works, it had the limitation of only
enforcing awards that strictly followed the rules of procedure
where the arbitration took place.74 Change was needed to solidify
the conception and recognition of fully international arbitration
awards." The ICC proposed a largely "de-nationalized" form of
arbitration, with processes and awards largely detached from
national laws.76 The United Nations' Economic and Social
Council ("ECOSOC"), also tasked with producing a draft
convention, produced their own delocalized version of a
convention.77  The ECOSOC draft was considered to be quite
conservative in its approach-in some ways more conservative
than the Geneva Convention.7 ' The ECOSOC attracted delegates
to meet and discuss revisions but left the attendees faced with two
distinct visions of how the new convention would be drafted."
The resulting conference, known as the United Nations
Conference on Commercial Arbitration, was attended by forty-five
nations and produced a compromise between the ICC and
ECOSOC versions. Even without knowing the bright future that
lay ahead of it, the resulting Convention was a major improvement
over its Geneva predecessor. Of its improvements, the most
important was the elimination of the cumbersome "double
exequatur" requirement, which required that an award could only
be recognized abroad if the courts at the site of the arbitration
confirmed it.8o This extra step slowed the winning party's ability
to enforce the award and left that party vulnerable to the bias of
the domestic courts at the site of the arbitration." In addition, the
Convention expanded its coverage from just the recognition and
enforcement of arbitral awards to the enforcement of international
74 Id.
75 Id
76 Id
77 Id. at 93-94.
78 HAMID G. GHARAVI, THE INTERNATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS OF THE ANNULMENT OF
AN ARBITRAL AWARD 50 (2002).
79 BORN, supra note 5, at 94.
80 Kenneth R. Davis, Unconventional Wisdom: A New Look at Articles Vand VII of
the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 37
TEX. INT'L L.J. 43, 55 (2002).
81 Id.
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arbitration agreements.82 These adoptions were added in a "race
against time" late in the conference, as attendees realized that
focusing on awards was insufficient." The final document, in
significant part due to the efforts of business interests, proved to
be a great success.8 4
Unfortunately, even the most successful legal innovations
cannot avoid conflict indefinitely. As with virtually any widely
relied upon statements or principles, disagreement over some
language of the Convention has developed into controversy.85
Whether the rush to finalize the draft impacted its language will be
left to history, but what is clear is that the language of the
Convention has been unable to contain the varying perspectives of
national courts. 6 These disagreements planted the seeds of a
conflict that has divided intra-national and infra-national courts as
well as generated voluminous discussion in academic
scholarship." The conflict over the appropriate scope of the
enforcement of annulled awards, which arose out of this
interpretive ambiguity, is the subject of the next section.
III. The Legal Debate Surrounding the Enforcement of
Annulled Arbitration Awards
A. The Source of the Debate under the Convention
Arbitration is by its nature consensual. Parties must use
arbitration only if they have agreed to do so." Arbitration not only
requires an agreement to arbitrate, but also establishes the scope of
82 BORN, supra note 5, at 94.
83 Id at 94 n.550.
84 See Guy S. Lipe & Timothy J. Tyler, The Hague Convention on Choice of Court
Agreements: Creating Room for Choice in International Cases, 33 Hous. J. INT'L L. 1,
37-38 (2010).
85 See, e.g., Amber A. Ward, Comment, Circumventing the Supremacy Clause?:
Understanding the Constitutional Implications of the United States' Treatment of Treaty
Obligations Through an Analysis of the New York Convention, 7 SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J.
491, 498-99 (2006) ("Article V allows the rendering country to annul an arbitral award.
Article VII allows the enforcing country to override an Article V annulment, which will
generally be based on the local law of the rendering country, and uphold an arbitral
award on the basis of the more favorable domestic law of the enforcing country.").
86 See id
87 See id.
88 BORN, supra note 5, at 173.
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covered disputes; rules and use of an institution; and the language,
seat, and choice of law of the arbitration." After the arbitrator or
arbitration tribunal reaches a decision, the non-prevailing party is
expected to pay the awarded amount.o Responses from users of
commercial arbitration reveal that most parties see the writing on
the arbitral wall and end the conflict here. One survey reports that
in over three-quarters of respondents' arbitration proceedings, the
non-prevailing party voluntarily complied with the arbitral
award." Parties will also regularly settle after an award in order to
obtain prompt payment by avoiding recognition and enforcement
proceedings in a foreign jurisdiction.92 With four out of five
disputes resolved without court intervention, participating firms
reveal a solid satisfaction with the arbitral process.93
Problems begin when the judiciary intervenes in the
recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards. Such intervention
can begin when a losing party feels strongly that an award is
unjust; it can seek to set aside or annul the award granted by the
arbitrator.94 Grounds for annulment are typically sought in the
domestic forum where the arbitration occurred.95 Most national
courts will grant annulment due to lack of an arbitration
agreement, improper scope, improper subject matter, insufficient
opportunity to present, or because the award is contrary to public
policy.9 6
In especially protracted cases, the annulment of an arbitration
award by the court does not necessarily end the dispute. The party
whose award was annulled can seek to get the award enforced in
an entirely different court system.97 This secondary enforcement
action raises some difficult questions regarding the proper role of a
judiciary over an arbitral award in another jurisdiction.
89 Id.
90 See id. at 174.
91 PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note 66, at 2.
92 Id. at 3.
93 Id. at 5, 6 (reporting that "86% of respondents were satisfied with international
arbitration" and that "81% of disputes [were] resolved without the intervention of a
national court").
94 BORN, supra note 5, at 2552.
95 Id
96 Id. at 2552-53.
97 See id. at 2675-88.
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Through no fault of the original drafters, who likely could not
have anticipated such a circumstance taking on a life of its own,
the Convention provides insufficient guidance on resolving this
difficult issue. Two articles of the Convention are relevant to this
issue: the set aside grounds of Article V" and the local
empowerment language of Article VII.9 9
Article V of the Convention states that "[r]ecognition and
enforcement of the award may be refused" if, among other
reasons, the award has been "set aside by a competent authority of
the country" in which the award was made."'o The obvious
interpretation of this language enables courts to decline
enforcement of annulled awards. However, the permissive "may"
in Article V does not compel courts to refuse enforcement. In the
spirit of its brevity, the Convention does not provide any more
detail.o' Thus, the Convention neither compels courts not to
enforce annulled awards nor provides guidance as to when
enforcement or non-enforcement would be appropriate.
If this were the only relevant language in the Convention
applicable to recognition of annulled awards, the ambiguity might
not have become so controversial. Interpreting courts might have
developed their own standards for when enforcement was
appropriate, resulting in some coalescence around general
principles. However, the presence of Article VII, necessary
language in its own right, makes interpreting the text in Article V
more difficult. Article VII affirms that the Convention "shall
not ... deprive any interested party of any right he may have to
avail himself of an arbitral award . .. [as] allowed by the law or
the treaties of the country where such award is sought to be relied
upon."l0 2 Article VII, through the application of favorable local
laws and bilateral treaties, encourages greater enforcement of
annulled awards. Article VII's mandatory "shall," in contrast to
the permissive "may" of Article V, compels courts not to deprive
parties of relevant national rights. To the extent that the two
Articles point in opposite directions, they arguably conflict with
98 See New York Convention, supra note 3, at art. V(1)(e).
99 See id. art. VII.
100 Id. art. V(1)(e) (emphasis added).
101 See id.
102 Id. art. VII.
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one another in furthering their stated goals.103 However, if one
were to read the two articles together, the combination of Article
V and Article VII creates a strong suggestion that an annulled
award may, but does not have to, be denied recognition. Not
surprisingly, the result has led to a conflicted body of decisions
that attempts to grapple with these provisions.
B. The Chromalloy-TermoRio Divide in the United States
and Beyond
In the United States, the conflicting interpretations of Article V
and VII have played out prominently through a quartet of federal
court opinions. The first of this quartet, and perhaps the most
prominent, is the oft-discussed case of Chromalloy Aeroservices v.
Arab Republic of Egypt.'0 4 Summarized briefly,"' Chromalloy
contracted with the Egyptian government to provide helicopter
maintenance for its air force.'06 Yet two and a half years after the
agreement was signed, Egypt terminated the contract. 10 7  In
response, Chromalloy rejected the cancellation and began
arbitration proceedings.' Chromalloy won, and the arbitration
panel ordered the Egyptian government to pay over $17 million in
damages.'0 9 While Chromalloy's efforts to enforce the award were
pending in the United States, Egypt successfully sought
nullification from the Egyptian Court of Appeal.i"0 This left the
U.S. court in the uncomfortable position of deciding whether to
enforce the arbitrator's decision or to defer to the Egyptian court.
103 See, e.g., James M. Gaitis, International and Domestic Arbitration Procedure:
The Need for a Rule Providing a Limited Opportunity for Arbitral Reconsideration of
Reasoned Awards, 15 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 9, 67 (2004); Ward, supra note 85, at 498-
99.
104 939 F. Supp. 907 (D.D.C. 1996).
105 Chromalloy's machinations are more detailed than this, and numerous other
works provide more thorough discussions of the court's opinion. E.g., Davis, supra note
80, at 48-50.
106 Chromalloy, 939 F. Supp. at 908.
107 Id.
10 Id
109 Id
I 10 Id. at 908. The Egypt Court of Appeal reasoned that the arbitrators had
misapplied Egyptian law. Id at 911. The arbitral panel, when faced with this issue,
concluded that it did not matter whether administrative law (which Egypt wanted) or
civil law applied to the dispute. Id. at 908.
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Of significant interest here is the court's interpretation of the
Convention. Not surprisingly, the court noted that Article V(1) of
the Convention used permissive language, citing the critical word
"may" in the phrase "[r]ecognition and enforcement of the award
may be refused. . . .""' Noting this permissiveness, the court then
relied on Article VII, which enables parties to utilize provisions of
national law that are more favorable than those in the
Convention.'12 The court emphasized that while Article V's
language was discretionary, Article VII required courts to allow
parties to avail themselves of greater rights under local law."' The
court then examined U.S. law to see if more permissive rights
were available and found such rights in the Federal Arbitration
Act, which contains a strong public policy toward enforcing
international arbitration awards.l' Finding such rights under local
law, the court concluded that under U.S. law, the arbitration award
was entitled to recognition."'
Chromalloy has taken a beating over the past fifteen years with
numerous writers levying sharp criticism against it."' Some
scholars have argued that the Federal Arbitration Act does not
apply to international arbitration and that the Chromalloy Court
should not have relied on it."' Others have critiqued that
Chromalloy held that an arbitration clause stating that an award
shall be final and not subject to appeal is apparently sufficient to
111 Chromalloy, 939 F. Supp. at 909.
112 See id.
113 See id. at 909-10.
114 Id. at 910-12. The Federal Arbitration Act permits awards to be vacated by a
court only under very limited circumstances, such as fraud or bias, or when the award
was made in "manifest disregard" of the law. Id at 910; see also 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(1)-(4)
(2006).
115 Chromalloy, 939 F. Supp. at 912, 914.
116 E.g., Nina H. Mohebbi, Comment, Back Door Arbitration: Why Allowing
Nonsignatories to Unfairly Utilize Arbitration Clauses May Violate the Seventh
Amendment, 12 U. PA. J. Bus. L. 555, 563 n.54 (2010) (noting that the decision has
received heavy criticism) (citing William W. Park, Duty and Discretion in International
Arbitration, 93 AM. J. INT'L. L. 805, 807 (1999)) (noting that the court reached this
conclusion "[i]n an opinion [supported by] neither precedent nor progeny").
117 See Nicholas Pengelley, The Convention Strikes Back: Enforcement of
International Commercial Arbitration Awards Annulled Elsewhere, 8 VINDOBONA J.
INT'L COM. L. & ARB. 195, 200 (2004).
1031
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
make a vacated award enforceable." 8 However, other notable
experts have defended the Chromalloy case and reasoning" 9 or at
least advocated for a modified version of the Chromalloy
approach.120  Thus, whether Chromalloy is savior or scourge
depends upon which author's work you read.
Three years later, two additional decisions followed. In Baker
Marine, Ltd. v. Chevron, Ltd,12 1 the parties' barge services
contact grew acrimonious, and arbitration was pursued via a broad
arbitration clause,12 2  resulting in a victory for Baker Marine.123
Chevron and its fellow defendant, Danos and Curole Marine
Contractors, sought to vacate the award that Baker Marine was
trying to enforce in the Nigerian Federal High Court.124  The
Nigerian court set aside the award, and Baker Marine attempted to
have the arbitration award enforced in the United States.12 5
However, unlike in Chromalloy, the court refused to enforce
the award.126  The court recognized that Article V(1)(e) does not
compel a court to respect an annulled award, and the court
concluded that no sufficient reason existed to override the
judgments of the Nigerian court.127  Although the court invoked
the same federal arbitration policy as the court in Chromalloy, the
court held that such policy was simply that arbitration agreements
be treated like contracts and that enforcing an annulled award
would thwart U.S. arbitration policy.128
18 See Christopher R. Drahozal, Enforcing Vacated International Arbitration
Awards: An Economic Approach, 11 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 451, 478 (2000) [hereinafter
Drahozal, Enforcing].
119 See Pengelley, supra note 117, at 200. For an insightful analysis in support of
Chromalloy, see BORN, supra note 5, at 2681-84.
120 See Drahozal, Enforcing, supra note 118, at 453, 478-79.
121 191 F.3d 194 (2d Cir. 1999).
122 Id. at 195. The clause stated that "[any dispute, controversy or claim arising out
of this Contract, or the breach, termination or validity thereof, shall be finally and
conclusively settled by arbitration in accordance with the Arbitration Rules of the United
Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL)." Id
123 Id. at 195-96.
124 Id. at 196.
125 Id. at 196-98.
126 Baker Marine, 191 F.3d at 196-98.
127 Id at 197. The court further noted that Baker Marine, the party seeking
enforcement, never claimed that the Nigerian court acted contrary to Nigerian law. Id.
128 Id The court did not analyze whether the arbitration award fell under the limited
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That same year, Spier v. Calzaturificio Tecnica, S.P.A.129 was
decided. The Spier court, like its predecessors, was asked to
recognize an annulled award reached and then set aside in a
foreign jurisdiction.130  Relying on Baker Marine in its
interpretation of the Convention, the court declined to enforce the
annulled award.' 3 ' The court supported its conclusion by noting
that the Italian courts nullified the award because the arbitrators
exceeded their powers, a valid ground for nullification under the
Federal Arbitration Act.132
While Chromalloy remains prominently discussed, Baker
Marine and Spier have been largely overshadowed by TermoRio
S.A. E.S.P. v. Electranta S.P.1" as representative of courts taking
the opposite view to Chromalloy. 14 In TermoRio, a Colombian
firm agreed to generate and sell electric power to Electranta, a
Colombian government entity.'"' Less than one year later,
Colombia sought to sell its electrical company assets to private
owners and other Colombian utilities.'3 6 As a result, Electranta
was left with obligations to TermoRio to buy power but without
resources to do so.'
TermoRio sought arbitration pursuant to their agreement,138
and the arbitration tribunal ordered Electranta to pay TermoRio
$60.3 million.139 In response, Electranta filed an "extraordinary
writ" in the Colombian courts seeking to overturn the award.140
The court granted the request, reasoning that the arbitration had to
be conducted in accordance with Colombian law, and Colombian
FAA conditions that allow an award to be annulled including the manifest disregard
standard. Id; see 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(1)-(4).
129 663 F. Supp. 871 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
130 Id. at 872 (addressing an Italian court decision).
131 Id. at 875.
132 Id
133 487 F.3d 928 (D.C. Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1038 (2007).
134 See, e.g., id.
135 Id. at 930.
136 Id
137 Id. at 931.
138 TermoRio, 487 F.3d at 931.
'39 Id.
140 Id
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law at the time did not expressly permit the use of ICC rules in
arbitration proceedings. 4 ' TermoRio's two lawsuits in Colombian
courts seeking to rescind the transfer of Electranta's assets to
another company were not successful.1 42
TermoRio then sought to enforce the annulled award in the
United States. 143 The D.C. Circuit refused to do so.'" The U.S.
court reasoned that the Colombian court was a competent
authority to review the award and nothing in the record revealed
that the proceedings were "tainted or that the judgment of that
court [was] other than authentic . . . .,,145 The court was also asked
to enforce the award on public policy grounds; the court responded
that it is a mistake to suggest "that the Convention policy in favor
of enforcement of arbitration awards effectively swallows the
command of Article V(l)(e)."l46 The court ruled that to be
overturned on public policy grounds, a judgment would have to be
"repugnant to fundamental notions of what is decent and just in
the State where enforcement is sought," explaining that "[t]he
standard is high, and infrequently met," and concluding that it
should be used "[o]nly in clear-cut cases ought it to avail the
defendant." 47
To the extent that such a conflict exists, 148 the TermoRio-
Chromalloy divide has been evaluated by some as an initial
discretionary perspective towards enforcing annulled awards
(Chromalloy) being gradually whittled away by subsequent cases
(Baker Marine, Spier) with a final appellate opinion (TermoRio)
isolating Chromalloy to its facts.149 However, in some quarters the
141 Id
142 Id
143 TermoRio, 487 F.3d at 931.
144 Id. at 932.
145 Id. at 935.
146 Id. at 937.
147 Id at 938.
148 The TermoRio decision did not explicitly evaluate Chromalloy but instead
distinguished it on the grounds that "an express contact provision was violated by
pursuing an appeal to vacate the award." Id. at 937.
149 As two arbitration specialists explain:
Because the D.C. Circuit distinguished Chromalloy on the basis of different
contract provisions, it was unnecessary to decide whether the Chromalloy
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divide these two opinions represent runs much deeper. Pedro J.
Martinez-Fraga, author of a recent book on the American
influence on international commercial arbitration, comments that
"[t]he [TermoRio] opinion is comprehensive and particularly
impressive because . . . it fully integrates . . . an analysis resting on
eleven fundamental premises and no fewer than seven policy
considerations.""'o Noting that the court "deftly addressed"' the
conflicting underlying policies between Article V(1)(e) and
Article VII, the author concluded that "[t]he TermoRio opinion is
fundamentally positive in that it appears to have reached the right
result."' 52
By contrast, Gary Born, author of the well-known treatise
International Commercial Arbitration, writes to bury TermoRio,
rather than praise it.' According to Born, this "very
unsatisfactorily" reached decision is "fundamentally mistaken."l5 4
The Colombian court's annulment of an arbitration agreement
because it considered using ICC rules to be per se invalid
represents "one of the most egregious violations of the
Convention's requirement that Contracting States recognize
decision was correct. The effect of this, however, was to limit Chromalloy's
continuing effect to the most narrow of circumstances: namely, when there is a
violation of express contractual language prohibiting an appeal of awards. It
seems reasonably likely to us that, if it had been necessary to do so, the D.C.
Circuit would have expressly disapproved of Chromalloy.
The rule regarding annulled awards now seems clear: the secondary court
should defer to the decision of the court that annulled or set aside the award,
except in those rare cases that the judgment is "repugnant to fundamental
notions of what is decent and just." It is also clear that the court with primary
jurisdiction to review an award may annul or set it aside on any basis permitted
by its national jurisprudence. Given the high public policy hurdle, it may be a
rare case in which an award previously annulled or set aside will be later
enforced.
Jonathan I. Blackman & Ellen London, Respecting Awards Annulled at the Seat of
Arbitration: The Roadfrom Chromalloy to TermoRio, 63 Disp. RESOL. J. 70, 75 (2008).
150 PEDRO J. MARTINEZ-FRAGA, THE AMERICAN INFLUENCE ON INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: DOCTRINAL DEVELOPMENTS AND DISCOVERY METHODS 180
(2009).
151 Id. at 183.
152 Id. at 186.
153 See BORN, supra note 5, at 2683-87.
154 Id. at 2685-86.
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arbitration agreements that can be hypothesized.""' Born thus
concludes that TermoRio's reliance on this Colombian "decision is
gravely mistaken and itself a likely violation of the Convention's
obligations."l5 6
Only amplifying this divide is the divergent treatment of the
enforcement of annulled awards on a global scale. The permissive
Chromalloy case appears restrictive when compared to the
treatment of annulled awards in French courts."' French courts
have long held that awards annulled in other countries may be
readily enforced on French soil."' Under French law, the grounds
for annulling an arbitration awards are narrower than those of the
Convention.' 9 The French court's position rests exclusively on
the text of Article VII Which states: "[T]he Convention shall not
deny a party of more favorable rights of recognition and
enforcement under the law of the country where the award is
sought to be relied upon."1 6 0
The long-running and popular saga of Hilmarton Ltd. v.
Omnium de Traitement et de Valorisation (OTV)16' highlights this
practice. Stated briefly, an English firm contracted with a French
company to help it obtain a government contract in Algeria.162
OTV only paid half its bill, and Hilmarton sought a remedy
pursuant to the arbitration clause in the contract under ICC rules in
Switzerland.163  In arbitration, Hilmarton lost.164  Hilmarton
appealed to the Swiss courts, whose highest court affirmed the
155 Id. at 2687.
156 Id
157 Compare Chromalloy Aeroservices v. Arab Republic of Egypt, 939 F. Supp.
907, 912 (D.D.C. 1996), with Cour de Cassation [Cass.][Supreme Court for Judicial
Matters] le civ., Mar. 23, 1994, reprinted in 1994 Revue de I'Arbitrage 327, 327-28
(Fr.).
158 BORN, supra note 5, at 2677.
159 See id at 2678; NOUVEAU CODE DE PROCEDURE CIVILE [N.C.P.C.] art. 1502
(Fr.).
160 Silberman, supra note 16, at 28 n.9 (citing New York Covention, supra note 3,
art. VII).
161 1994 Revue de l'Arbitrage at 327.
162 GHARAVI, supra note 78, at 119.
163 See id at 120.
164 See id
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lower appellate court's annulment denying Hilmarton's claim.165
OTV sought enforcement of the award in France and,
notwithstanding the Swiss decision, the French court enforced the
award.166
Not to be outdone, Hilmarton sought to enforce the Swiss
court's annulment of the arbitration award in France, and a French
court in Nanterre recognized the Swiss court's annulment.'6 7 The
dispute was resubmitted for arbitration in Switzerland, and a new
arbitration award was granted in favor of Hilmarton.'" Hilmarton
sought to enforce this new and favorable award in France,169 and
the French court agreed to enforce it.'"
As a result, at one point there were two conflicting awards in
the French courts, one enforcing the original award where
Hilmarton lost, the other enforcing the second award where
Hilmarton won."' Apparently the French courts had no problem
with this, as they held it did not violate French public policy and
stated that parties could use French civil procedure to annul one of
the existing decisions.'7 2 Ultimately, the French courts resolved
the conflict by dismissing the judgments in favor of Hilmarton.'7 3
However, one award still remained in force in England where it
was granted enforcement by England's High Court.174
The Hilmarton saga shows just how convoluted and
conflicting arbitration awards can become when a national court
affords itself the full recognition powers of Article VII with no
limitation by the permissive set aside standards in Article V(1)(e).
In short, French courts "appear to accord no weight to decisions of
foreign courts, including the arbitral seat, annulling an arbitral
I65 Id
166 Id. The Appellate Court upheld the enforcement of the award by the lower court,
and the French Supreme Court affirmed the Appellate Court's decision. Id
167 GHARAVI, supra note 78, at 120.
168 Id at 120-21.
169 Id
170 See id.
171 See id at 120.
172 GHARAVI, supra note 78, at 121.
173 Id. at 122.
174 Id. at 122. See also Omnium de Traitement et de Valorisation S.A. v. Hilmarton
LTD, [1999] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 222 (Eng.).
1037
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. [Vol. XXXVII
award.""' All that matters is that its national New Code of Civil
Procedure Article 1502 is satisfied.'7 6
Such a self-centered perspective impairs the harmony of
international relations.'77 More importantly for international firms,
it impedes the smooth functioning of international dispute
resolution. If more countries adopted the French system, firms
would have difficulty ascertaining when an arbitration dispute is
truly complete.'7 ' Appeals would inevitably be filed in the most
permissive jurisdiction. As in Hilmarton, conflicting judgments
across, and even within, national boundaries could plague the
planning and decision-making of global organizations. Thus, the
divergence of opinion on the interpretation of the Convention is
not just a U.S. phenomenon, but it is a global problem in need of a
long term resolution.
IV. Toward a "New" Convention
The widespread controversy over the propriety of the
enforcement of annulled arbitration awards has necessitated
revisions that would reconcile these conflicts and offer a uniform
175 BORN, supra note 5, at 2680.
176 Id. As one author explains bluntly:
The problem with the Hilmarton jurisprudence ... is that one loses any sense of
right and wrong in the procedural technicalities. . . . The court seems to be
upholding a double standard: an international award cannot be conclusively
integrated in the legal order of the rendition forum but can be so in the
enforcement forum. Put crudely, the French position would be that an
international relative currency of awards is acceptable so long as it is kept out of
its backyard.
Georgios C. Petrochilos, Enforcing Awards Annulled in Their State of Origin Under the
New York Convention, 48 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 856, 870 (1999).
177 GHARAVI, supra note 78, at 123 ("This ... attitude constitutes nothing but a
return to the principle of absolute territorialism according to which 'no sovereign is
obliged to give effect to laws and judgments of foreign sovereigns."') (quoting Pierre
Mayer, L'Etat et le droit international privi, 16 DROITS. REVUE FRAN4AISE DE THIORIE
JURIDIQUE 33, 39 (1992)).
178 France is not the only nation that takes a relatively permissive view towards
enforcement. Id. at 87-92 (describing case law in Belgium and Austria); see also BORN,
supra note 5, at 2680-81 (noting examples of Belgian and Austrian courts recognizing
foreign annulled arbitration awards).
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approach. Other revisions have been proposed,'7 9 but perhaps the
most important effort has been led by Albert Jan van den Berg.'80
Professor van den Berg is arguably the world's leading expert on
the Convention and is at the forefront of the calls for change and
modernization.'"' His effort offers a revision that could materially
impact how the Convention is interpreted.18 2
The revision, termed the "Hypothetical Draft Convention on
the International Enforcement of Arbitration Agreements and
179 For example, the American Law Institute (ALI) has authored a worthwhile
proposal in its Restatement (Third) of the U.S. Law of International Commercial
Arbitration. See Projects, Restatement Third, The U.S. Law ofInternational Commercial
Arbitration, AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE CURRENT,
http://www.ali.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=projects.projip&projectid=20 (last visited
Mar. 22, 2012). The project began in 2007 and a tentative draft was approved at the
ALI's 2010 annual meeting. Id. Section 5-12 of the Restatement addresses award set
aside proceedings for arbitration awards. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF U.S. LAW OF INT'L
COMMERCIAL ARB. § 5-12 (Proposed Official Draft 2011). In this draft, the ALI propose
a restrictive enforcement climate more similar to that held in TermoRio than Chromalloy,
whose reasoning ALI explicitly declines to adopt. The Restatement permits enforcement
of a set aside award if the foreign authority was not competent to do so or if the award
was otherwise not entitled to recognition. See id. at § 5-12 cmt. d (Proposed Official
Draft 2011). The Restatement also permits enforcement under "extraordinary
circumstances" which might exist if the court "knowingly and egregiously departed from
the rules governing set-aside in that jurisdiction" or if "other facts give rise to substantial
and justifiable doubts about the integrity or independence of the foreign court with
respect to the judgment in question." Id. The Reporter's notes also foreclose Article VII
of the Convention from overwhelming the set-aside restrictions in Article V. Id. at § 5-12
n. d. The notes state that, notwithstanding the "imperative language 'shall not . . .
deprive' in Article VII, that provision does not apply if there exists within the
jurisdiction no alternative regime applicable to the Convention award in question. For
Convention awards, Chapter One of the FAA does not constitute such an alternative
regime." Id. (quoting New York Convention, supra note 3).
180 Professor van den Berg is a Professor at Law and the Arbitration Chair at
Erasmus University in Rotterdam, but currently he is a visiting Professor of Law at the
University of Miami. He has also served as President of the Netherlands Arbitration
Institute. Albert Jan van den Berg, UNIV. OF MIAMI SCH. OF LAW,
http://www.law.miami.edu/facadmin/visiting/avandenberg.php (last visited Mar. 30,
2011).
181 SIMON GREENBERG, CHRISTOPHER KEE & J. ROMESH WEERAMANTRY,
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: AN ASIA-PACIFIC PERSPECTIVE 430 (2011).
182 Albert Jan van den Berg, Hypothetical Draft Convention on the International
Enforcement of Arbitration Agreements and Awards, INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL FOR
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (May 2008), available at http://www.arbitration-
icca.org/media/0/1 2133674097980/hypotheticaldraft conventionajbrevO6.pdf
[hereinafter van den Berg, Draft Convention].
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Awards," ("Draft Convention") arises from an assessment of the
Convention at the 2008 International Council for Commercial
Arbitration Conference. 183 While the proposed modifications are
significant, they do not undermine the Convention's core
purposes. The goals of increasing recognition of arbitration
agreements and facilitating enforcement of arbitral awards remain
intact. 8 4  Instead, the revision stems from a need for
modernization of key provisions to account for prevailing legal
interpretations and business practices.' According to Professor
van den Berg, a number of provisions need to be added, revised, or
clarified.' These provisions include defining the scope for which
a court can refer cases to arbitration under Convention Article II
(3),187 clarifying what is meant by the clause "duly authenticated
original award" in Article IV(1)(a)," and deleting a reference to
"permanent arbitral bodies" in Article I(2),' which was
apparently an allusion to arbitration occurring before trade
183 See Marike R.P. Paulsson, The Miami Draft: the Good Twin of the NYC,
KLUWER ARBITRATION BLOG, (Oct. 7, 2010),
http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/blog/2010/10/07/the-miami-draft-the-good-twin-of-the-
nyc/. Professor van den Berg presented the keynote address at the conference where he
discussed his proposed revisions to the New York Convention. See ICCA Conference
Program, INT'L COUNCIL FOR COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (2008), available at
http://www.arbitration-icca.org/media/0/12785538967010/icca-dublin-2008.pdf.
184 See Albert Jan van den Berg, A Closer Look at the Proposed "New New York
Convention ", 3 GLOBAL ARB. REV. 14, 14 (2008) [hereinafter van den Berg, Proposed
"New New York Convention"] ("The object and purpose of the Draft Convention are the
same as for the New York Convention: to facilitiate the enforcement of the arbitration
agreement and arbitral award as much as possible."); Steven R. Swanson, Antisuit
Injunctions in Support of International Arbitration, 81 TUL. L. REV. 395, 407 (2006);
ALBERT JAN VAN DEN BERG, THE NEW YORK ARBITRATION CONVENTION OF 1958:
TOWARDS A UNIFORM JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION 6-9 (1981).
185 See Paulsson, supra note 183 ("The drafters of the Convention in 1958 could
never have been able to produce a text that would foresee the issues which we confront
in 2010, no more than the founding fathers of the US Constitution could have anticipated
the world wide web.").
186 Albert Jan van den Berg, Hypothetical Draft Convention on the International
Enforcement of Arbitration Agreements and Awards: Explanatory Note, INT'L COUNCIL
FOR COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (May 2008), available at http://www.arbitration-
icca.org/media/0/12133703697430/explanatorynoteajb rev06.pdf [hereinafter van den
Berg, Explanatory Note].
187 Id. at 1.
188 Id
189 Id. at 2.
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tribunals in communist countries. 9 0 The portions of the Draft
Convention most relevant to this manuscript, Articles 5 and 7, are
reproduced at the end of this article with comparisons to the
original Convention text. 191
Perhaps not surprisingly, the Draft Convention revises the
controversial Convention provisions governing enforcement of
annulled arbitration awards. As noted earlier, the permissive word
"may" in Article V(l)(e) of the Convention has enabled courts in
various countries, including the United States, to enforce an
arbitration award even though the award was annulled by a
national court in the country where the arbitration took place.' 92
Instead, the Draft Convention states, in relevant parts:
Article 5 - Grounds for Refusal of Enforcement
3. Enforcement of an arbitral award shall be refused if, at the
request of the party against whom the award is invoked, that
party asserts and proves that:
(g) the award has been set aside by the court in the country
where the award was made on grounds equivalent to grounds (a)
to (e) of this paragraph[.]l 93
Embedded within this short revision is a significant and useful
clarification regarding enforcement of annulled awards. Professor
van den Berg takes a middle road between various scholarly and
judicial proposals. The Draft Convention avoids a robust
prohibition on the enforcement of awards annulled in another
jurisdiction, as some scholars have suggested.194 This position is
190 Leonard V. Quigley, Accession by the United States Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 70 YALE L. J. 1049, 1061
(1961); see also Lazare Kopelmanas, The Settlement of Disputes in International Trade,
61 COLUM. L. REV. 384, 392 (1961) (noting that the provision was inserted at the request
of the Soviet delegation in order to guarantee that "agreements to arbitrate before the
Arbitral Commissions in eastern Europe will be respected by the signatory states and
their national courts").
191 See infra Appendix Figures 1-2.
192 See supra Part III.B.
193 van den Berg, Draft Convention, supra note 182, art. 5(3)(g).
194 See, e.g., WILLIAM M. REISMAN, SYSTEMS OF CONTROL IN INTERNATIONAL
ADJUDICATION & ARBITRATION: BREAKDOWN AND REPAIR 114 (1992) ("[O]nce an award
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one roughly similar to that taken in TermoRio, holding that, unless
proceedings were tainted or the judgment inauthentic, a secondary
court could not enforce an annulled award that has been lawfully
set aside by a competent authority.'
Such a prohibition, however, could imply refusal of
enforcement regardless of the situs court's reasoning, conceivably
allowing annulments based upon self-serving local interests to
stand unchallenged. While this is certainly problematic, of
significant concern is the practice of courts routinely enforcing
arbitration awards that have been set aside without meaningful
limitation. Such freewheeling enforcement that elevates the
policies of the enforcement jurisdiction over the courts in the
arbitral situs creates a "lack of uniform reaction" that "among the
foreign countries could be disastrous."l9 6
has been set aside in a primary jurisdiction, it is not supposed to be enforceable
anywhere else. Once a venue or a governing law is selected, the [New York] convention
gives to it a primacy with regard to validity of an award."). Professor van den Berg
implied a similar theory in passing in an older article. See Albert Jan van den Berg, When
is an Arbitral Award Nondomestic Under the New York Convention of 1958?, 6 PACE L.
REV. 25, 42 (1986) ("[I]f the arbitral award has been set aside in the country of origin,
foreign courts are bound by that decision. In that case they must refused recognition and
enforcement of the award.").
195 TermoRio S.A. E.S.P. v. Electranta S.P., 487 F.3d 928, 935 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
The court explained:
Pursuant to [article V(1)(e)] of the Convention, a secondary Contracting State
normally may not enforce an arbitration award that has been lawfully set aside
by a "competent authority" in the primary Contracting State. Because the
Consejo de Estado is undisputedly a "competent authority" in Colombia (the
primary State), and because there is nothing in the record here indicating that
the proceedings before the Consejo de Estado were tained or that the judgment
of that court is other than authentic, appellees contend that appellants have no
cause of action under the FAA or the New York Convention to enforce the
award in a Contracting state outside of Colombia. On the record at hand, we
agree.
Id. The court left open a narrow "public policy" exception stating that a judgment is
unenforceable when it is "repugnant to fundamental notions of what is decent and just in
the State where enforcement is sought." Id. (quoting Tahan v. Hodgson, 662 F.2d 862,
864 (D.C. Cir. 1981)).
196 Pierre Mayer, Revisiting Hilmarton and Chromalloy, in INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION AND NATIONAL COURTS: THE NEVER ENDING STORY 172 n.22 (Albert Jan
van den Berg ed., 2001).
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The Draft Convention prevents such unbridled enforcement
and, perhaps this is where the challenge lies; it carefully limits
enforcement of annulled awards to paragraphs (a) through (e) of
Article V of the Convention.197 These reasons include invalidity
of the agreement, lack of notice, improper scope of the award,
improper procedure followed, and binding nature of the award.1 98
Given that the Draft Convention does not substantially modify
these grounds from the Convention language drafted in 1958,19'
these grounds should be non-controversial to reviewing courts.
A. Improvements over the Current Convention
The Draft Convention system improves upon the current
regime. The Draft Convention increases the emphasis on the
primary jurisdiction.20 0 Courts from the arbitral situs will now
have greater control over arbitration awards issued in their
jurisdiction. The Draft Convention also lessens contradictory
results. Under the Draft Convention, an enforcement court will be
much less likely to interfere with the decision of the primary
jurisdiction; thus, there will be fewer instances of contradictory
judgments to confuse and muddle the literature. Interpreting
courts will be able to more quickly harmonize around a single set
of standards that interpret the Convention, rather than having
national splits over the discretion of enforcing courts.
Parties will also have greater control under the Draft
Convention. Firms cannot likely eliminate the risks of arbitration,
but with greater control that firms can assert over the arbitration
process, the more effectively arbitration risk can be assessed. The
Draft Convention more clearly affirms which court system will
govern the arbitration process should the judiciary be forced to
intervene. Contracting firms, who have already agreed to submit
their disputes to a particular jurisdictional tribunal if one arises,
197 See infra Appendix Figure 1.
198 Paragraphs (a) through (e) of the Convention and the Draft Convention are
largely similar to one another. Compare New York Convention, supra note 3, at art.
V(1)(a)-(e), with van den Berg, Draft Convention, supra note 182, at art. V(1)(a)-(e); see
also infra Appendix Figure 1.
199 See infra Appendix Figure 1.
200 Compare New York Convention, supra note 3, art. V(1)(a)-(e), with van den
Berg, Draft Convention, supra note 182, art. V(1)(a)-(e); see also infra Appendix Figure
1.
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will be more confident that the agreed upon tribunal and its
associated rules will resolve the disagreement. Firms with a
clearer assessment of arbitration costs can thus more precisely
evaluate whether a business decision should be undertaken.
Furthermore, litigation costs would decrease as parties who
found their awards annulled would be less likely to challenge that
annulment in another court. The Hilmarton case shows how
financially taxing a lengthy dispute over an arbitration award can
get.20' The Draft Convention's narrow and clear grounds would
deter losing parties from 'forum shopping' to obtain a favorable
remedy.202
The Draft Convention also furthers finality in dispute
resolution. Under this system, the annulment of the award is in
most cases the final resolution of the arbitration process.2 03 If
enforcement of annulled awards is narrowly circumscribed, firms
participating in arbitration can expect that the dispute will begin
and end in the same jurisdiction within a specified cost and period
of time.
Also, the likelihood of dual litigation arising from arbitration is
minimized. The constant threat of litigating the same dispute in
multiple forums hangs over every international business conflict.
Dual litigation can generate conflicting judgments and create a
troubling lack of certainty that can hobble a firm's continuing
201 See supra text accompanying notes 161-76.
202 Professor van den Berg has mentioned his disapproval of the enforcement of
annulled awards in the Hilmarton case, calling the French practice "an undesirable
development." Albert Jan van den Berg, New York Convention of 1958: Refusals of
Enforcement, 18 ICC INT'L CT. ARB. BULL. 1, 16 (2007). Also, Professor van den Berg
notes in the article his change of opinion from supporting the current Convention to
asserting that it is in need of revision:
In my previous contributions, I took the view that the text and structure of the
Convention do not seem to be at stake. However, I am no longer so certain of
this. The question is not so much whether the 10% of refusals can be avoided,
but rather that we should not be complacent with a text and a structure now 50
years old. The wear and tear they are undergoing might indeed be good reason
to consider revamping or indeed replacing the Convention.
Id. at 35.
203 See infra Appendix Figure 1-2.
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operations. 204  Dual litigation can also place a heavy financial
burden that drains money and time from business operations.20 5
To the extent that enforcement of annulled arbitral awards present
206a real risk, the risk dilutes the certainty and values of arbitration.
Reducing the ability for Hilmarton-style dual litigation involving
the enforcement of annulled awards, as the Draft Convention
proposes, 20 7 reinforces these values.
Finally, Draft Convention language more closely harmonizes
with other Arbitration Conventions on the enforcement of annulled
awards. For example, the European Convention on International
Commercial Arbitration ("ECICA") is a convention that governs
commercial relations for participating European member states. 208
Before the United Nations Conference in New York that
developed the Convention,209 the ECICA drafters sought to
salvage commercial transactions between Eastern and Western
Europe at a time when communist and capitalist states were
increasingly hostile toward one another.210
204 See Austen L. Parrish, Duplicative Foreign Litigation, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REv.
237, 244-47 (2010). See also N. Jansen Calamita, Rethinking Comity: Towards a
Coherent Treatment of International Parallel Proceedings, 27 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L.
601, 610 (2006) ("[T]here is almost nothing in principle to support the maintenance of
concurrent, parallel proceedings in the courts of different countries."); James C.
Rehnquist, Taking Comity Seriously: How to Neutralize the Abstention Doctrine, 46
STAN. L. REv. 1049, 1064 (1994) ("Many of the costs of duplicative litigation are self-
evident. It is patently wasteful.").
205 See Parrish, supra note 204, at 245.
206 Cf Robert C. McFarland, Federalism, Finality, and Foreign Judgments:
Examining the ALI Judgments Project's Proposed Federal Foreign Judgments Statute,
45 NEW. ENG. L. REv. 63, 72 (2010) (discussing the value of finality in the context of
court judgments both in the conservation of judicial resources and in the avoidance of
inconsistent judgments).
207 See van den Berg, Draft Convention, supra note 182.
208 See European Convention on International Commercial Arbitration of 1961 art.
IX (2), Apr. 21, 1961, 484 U.N.T.S. 364 [hereinafter ECICA]. The ECICA currently
"has 31 members, including most EU states and several non-EU members such as
Russia." Christian W. Konrad, Buried in Oblivion? The Significance and Limitations of
the European Convention on International Commercial Arbitration, KLUWER
ARBITRATION BLOG (Nov. 2, 2010),
http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/blog/2010/11/02/buried-in-oblivion-the-significance-
and-limitations-of-the-european-convention-on-international-commercial-arbitration/.
209 See CLAUDIA ALFONS, RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF ANNULLED FOREIGN
ARBITRAL AWARDS 53 (2010).
210 See id.
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Like the Convention, the ECICA articulates grounds where the
setting aside of an arbitration award in one jurisdiction impacts
enforcement in another.2 1 1 These grounds, including party
incapacity, agreement invalidity, violation of due process, excess
arbitrator authority, and irregularity in procedures, are present in
both the Convention 2 12 and the ECICA.2 13  However, the ECICA
uses the mandatory "shall" instead of the permissive "may," which
is used by the Convention.2 14 This approach establishes that an
award annulment or set aside in the arbitral state shall be the basis
of denying recognition or enforcement in another state only if the
arbitral state annulled or set aside the award on the grounds listed
in the ECICA. The ECICA does not require recognition and
enforcement of awards from foreign arbitration.2 15 instead, it
"provides negatively that annulment may be a basis for non-
recognition only in specified instances." 2 16
The Draft Convention harmonizes with the ECICA in that, like
its European counterpart, it limits the grounds under which an
award will be refused to specified circumstances. 217 Furthermore,
the Draft Convention compensates for the more limited scope of
the ECICA in this area. The ECICA was intended to supplement,
and not overtake, the Convention. 2 18  For historical reasons, the
ECICA focuses mainly on arbitral process and remains silent on
the mechanism of enforcement,2 19 leaving that issue to the broader
211 See ECICA, supra note 208, art. IX (1).
212 See New York Convention, supra note 3, art. (V)(1)(a)-(d).
213 See ECICA, supra note 208, art. IX (1); Konrad, supra note 209.
214 See ECICA, supra note 208, art. IX (1) ("The setting aside in a Contracting State
of an arbitral award covered by this Convention shall only constitute a ground for the
refusal of recognition or enforcement in another Contracting State where such setting
aside took place in a State in which, or under the law of which, the award has been made
and for one of the following reasons . . . .") (emphasis added).
215 See BORN, supra note 5, at 2340.
216 Id
217 See van den Berg, Draft Convention, supra note 182, at art. 5(3)(a)-(h).
218 See Konrad, supra note 208.
219 The emphasis on process originates from the political and commercial context in
which the ECICA was drafted. At the time, ineffective arbitration agreements,
particularly between Eastern and Western European firms, caused "grave problems ...
in the context of the arbitration procedure." ALFONS, supra note 209, at 53-54. Given
these problems and the recent passage of the Convention, the ECICA drafters decided to
give "particular focus on the arbitral process per se." Id. at 54.
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Convention. The Draft Convention picks up the ECICA's
jurisprudential slack and unequivocally supports a policy in favor
of enforcement, stating that enforcement of an award shall not be
refused except for its listed grounds.2 20  Thus, the Draft
Convention both endows greater specificity of enforcement upon
the ECICA while at the same time synchronizing its grounds for
set-aside with ECICA language.
B. Criticism of the Need for a Revised Convention
In spite of the many advantages of the Draft Convention, it has
also attracted criticism from contemporary scholars.2 2 1 One author
has neatly encapsulated these criticisms into three arguments:
"there is no need, no hope, and no danger." 22 2
The first rationale for non-revision is that the major issues
plaguing the enforcement of arbitral awards have no need to be
resolved through changes to the Convention. Changes tightening
enforcement provisions will do little to eliminate bias in favor of
local companies. 2 23 Russian courts, for example, have shown little
interest in enforcing awards that negatively impact the interests of
large state-owned enterprises. 224  A biased judiciary could
circumvent the Draft Convention by imposing its will through the
"public policy" exception to enforcement present in both the
Convention2 25 and the Draft Convention. 226  Revision would also
220 van den Berg, Draft Convention, supra note 182, art. 5(1) ("Enforcement of an
arbitral award shall not be refused on any ground other than the grounds expressly set
forth in this article.").
221 For one unusually florid critique, see V.V. Veeder, Is There a Need to Revise the
New York Convention?, I J. INT'L DisP. SETTLEMENT 499, 499 (2010). Veeder manage,s
in a single short speech, to light-heartedly compare the New York Convention to the Ten
Commandments, Jan van den Berg to Napoleon, and his Draft Convention to a "lame old
nag" at best and "cat-food" at worst. Id. at 499, 501, 506.
222 Emmanuel Gaillard, The Urgency of Not Revising the New York Convention, in
50 YEARS OF THE NEW YORK CONVENTION: ICCA INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION
CONFERENCE 689, 690 (Albert Jan van den Berg ed., 2009) [hereinafter Gaillard, The
Urgency].
223 The Honorable Jose A. Cabranes of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit stated that "[a]rbitration is uniquely well-suited to international commercial
disputes because it helps parties avoid bias from local tribunals." AAA Hosts Int'l
Arbitration Day, 52 DisP. RESOL. J. 4,4 (1997).
224 See Gaillard, The Urgency, supra note 222, at 690-91.
225 See New York Convention, supra note 3, art. (V)(2)(b).
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not suppress arbitrator bias, meaning the body of neutrals has been
accused of being oligarchic, insular, and vulnerable to incentives
to favor repeat players in arbitration proceedings.2 27
The second argument posits that revisions should not be
pursued because there is no hope of a revised adoption. In spite of
its flaws, the Convention has the advantage of long-standing
legitimacy. If a revised Convention were to be formally proposed,
unexpected controversies might emerge and nations could use the
revived discussion as an excuse to opt out by choosing not to sign
the new draft.22 8 It has taken decades to assemble the nearly 150
nations that are now parties to the current Convention.22 9
Cobbling together broad consensus to a new convention during the
next fifty years might be nearly impossible.23 0
Reinforcing this lack of hope is the fact that arbitration is
much more prevalent, and thus much more important, than it was
fifty years ago. Nations might see this redrafting as an opportunity
to reassert their national interests. If the arbitration "stakes" are
higher now than they were decades ago, nations might object to
provisions that would not have otherwise provoked scrutiny in the
1950s. Amplifying this problem is that nations themselves are
now participating in arbitration proceedings through investment
231treaties. State representatives do not simply see arbitration as a
facilitator for business but perceive themselves as potential
defendants in an arbitration proceeding.232 Defendants are
generally not keen on enhancing the enforcement process of
226 See van den Berg, Draft Convention, supra note 182, art. (5)(3)(h).
227 See LUTTRELL, supra note 58, at 4-5. The author harshly notes that the
international arbitration community "is regularly described as a mafia." Id. at 5 (quoting
Y. DEZALAY & B.G. GARTH, DEALING IN VIRTUE: INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF A TRANS-NATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 50 (1996)).
228 See ALFONS, supra note 209, at 177.
229 See Lipe & Tyler, supra note 84, at 37-38.
230 See Karen Stewart & Joseph Matthews, Online Arbitration of Cross-Border,
Business to Consumer Disputes, 56 U. MIAMI L. REv. 1111, 1138 (2002) ("[A]ny attempt
to revise the New York Convention might jeopardize the level of success that has been
achieved in the forty-plus years since its enactment.").
231 See, e.g., Susan D. Franck, Rationalizing Costs in Investment Treaty Arbitration,
88 WASH. U. L. REv. 769, 771 (2011) (noting dramatic increase in number of investment
treaty arbitrations and that "[b]illions of dollars . .. are at stake[]").
232 See Gaillard, supra note 222, at 692.
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awards through clarification or any other means.233 Thus, today,
firms are impacted not only by Convention rules, but by nations as
well.
Finally, leaving the Convention unmodified imposes no danger
on future international commercial arbitration. The Convention in
its current state can accommodate "the evolution of arbitration
law" because it only "sets a minimum standard."23 4  States can
adopt additional standards as they deem necessary. Other nations,
like France, do not regularly use the Convention because its
domestic laws are more flexible. 235  According to this argument,
states can apply or ignore the Convention as they see fit.
These concerns are certainly legitimate. The process of
revising a well-established convention is a time-consuming
endeavor and would certainly result in the non-adoption of a
number of participating nations, at least in the short term.
Furthermore, revision cannot resolve a number of pressing
problems that face arbitration.
However, Professor van den Berg's proposal is commendable,
and the arguments in favor of adopting his Draft Convention
remain compelling. First, Professor van den Berg's writings and
the surrounding literature reveal that a genuine need exists to
revise the Convention. 236  Three examples of such revisions are
listed earlier in this paper. 237 The Draft Convention makes dozens
of other changes that clarify, modernize, or add provisions.23 8
Even opponents to revision agree that the Convention's current
233 See id.
234 Id
235 See id.; Veeder, supra note 222, at 505.
236 See van den Berg, Explanatory Note, supra note 186, at 1-4; see also Jerry
Clark, Opportunity Knocks - The Role of International Trade Arbitration in Reducing
International Trade Barriers and Addressing Environmental Concerns, 13 CURRENTS:
INT'L TRADE L.J. 41, 48 (2004) (proposing revision to better define "notions of morality
and justice" and "to allow for a first level appeal process through international arbitral
tribunals" before reaching the judiciary).
237 See supra text accompanying notes 188-91.
238 See generally van den Berg, Explanatory Note, supra note 186 (explaining
changes the Draft convention makes to the New York Convention). Albert Jan van den
Berg created a side-by-side comparison of the New York Convention and the Draft
Convention, including a brief explanation of the proposed changes. van den Berg,
Proposed "New New York Convention ", supra note 184, at 15-20.
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language leaves room for improvement.23 9
The need for revision apparently cannot be readily
circumvented through other methods. One suggestion has been to
use the UNCITRAL Model Law in International Commercial
Arbitration of 1985 (Model Law),2 4 0 a uniform set of arbitration
laws designed to be adopted by national governments to create
uniform arbitration laws across jurisdictions. 2 41  The Model Law,
however, is in the same need of reform as the Convention, as the
drafters intended for the language of the Model Act to be similar
to that of the Convention.2 42 Furthermore, fewer than half the
number of states that have adopted the Convention have adopted
the Model Law.24 3
Some have suggested repairing the Convention through
interpretive recommendations,24 4 but this too may be insufficient.
Such interpretations might, if presented through learned or
legitimized sources, influence some courts in interpretation;
however, such interpretations might not be effective if they
expound on subjects that are not expressly presented in the
Convention or that directly conflict with the Convention's
language. A detailed textual structure might benefit from the
linguistic gap-filling an interpretation might provide, but the
239 E.g., Gaillard, The Urgency, supra note 222, at 690 n.4; Emmanuel Gaillard, Is
There a Need to Revise the New York Convention?, 2 DISP. RESOL. INT'L 187, 188 (2008)
(noting that the New York Convention has room for improvement and that such
improvement is technically feasible).
240 UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION
(2006).
241 See Harpreet Kaur, The 1996 Arbitration and Conciliation Act: A Step Toward
Improving Arbitration in India, 6 HASTINGS Bus. L.J. 261, 276 (2010).
242 See van den Berg, Proposed "New New York Convention", supra note 184, at
14. This includes the controversial New York Convention article V(1)(e), which
addresses the enforcement of annulled arbitration awards in other jurisdictions. See
Amina Dammann, Vacating Arbitration Awards for Mistakes of Fact, 27 REv. LITIG.
441, 452-53 (2008) (noting the similarity).
243 See Status, 1985 - UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial
Arbitration, with amendments as adopted in 2006, UNCITRAL,
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitraltexts/arbitration/I 985Modelarbitrationstat
us.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2012).
244 See Veeder, supra note 221, at 504 ("[A]ll of [van den Berg's proposals in the
Draft Convention] are essentially capable of resolution by treaty and legislative
interpretation without requiring any actual change of wording in the text of the New
York Convention.").
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briefly-worded Convention lacks the detail that could benefit most
from non-binding textual development.
In addition, textual interpretations might lack the legitimizing
contagion effect that national adoption of a treaty might imbue on
a revised Convention. If a small number of nations whose courts
and enterprises are highly involved in the commercial arbitration
process support a revised Convention, other nations may be
encouraged to follow.245 Recommendations from academics or
interested organizational bodies, no matter how thoughtful, might
not trigger that spark of diffusion upon which a widely-adopted
treaty can be based.246
Second, the difficulties present in revising the Convention are
indeed real. A revision to the Convention will require significant
time, effort, and resources. In 2008, Professor van den Berg wrote
that the second edition of his influential 1981 book on the
Convention, 24 7 due to be published in 2012,248 "may well appear
prior to a new New York Convention." 2 49  That prediction is
correct, and, indeed, a "new New York Convention" might not
appear for many years. However distant the goal might be, and
however challenging the problems that accompany it, the reward
of a new convention appears worth the effort, and movement
toward this convention should commence without delay.
Previous drafters could have faced the same disillusionment
when dealing with the difficulties of adopting new language in
245 See Eric A. Posner, International Law and the Disaggregated State, 32 FLA. ST.
U. L. REV. 797, 839-41 (2005) (describing the diffusion of norms through states and the
role of treaties). One such obvious national candidate for legitimization is the United
States. See generally Alford, supra note 12 (discussing numerous reasons why the
United States holds substantial influence over international arbitration). Another source
of legitimization might be Asian countries, who over the past thirty years have
dramatically warmed their climate toward international arbitration. See GREENBERG,
supra note 181, at 34-43.
246 But cf Rachel Good, Yes We Should: Why the US. Should Change Its Policy
Toward the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty, 9 Nw. J. INT'L HUM. RTs. 209,218 (2011) (describing
how treaty authors' receipt of the Nobel Prize for Peace spurred momentum for over one
hundred nations to sign the Mine Ban Treaty the day it became available for signature).
247 See van den Berg, Proposed "New New York Convention", supra note 184, at
21.
248 See Court Decisions, NEW YORK ARBITRATION CONVENTION,
http://www.newyorkconvention.org/court-decisions (last visited Mar. 22, 2012).
249 van den Berg, Proposed "New New York Convention", supra note 184, at 21.
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international arbitration. Arbitration has existed around the world
since mythology. 250 Greek gods Poseidon and Helios resolved
cross-national disputes over ownership of Corinth.25 ' Use of
commercial arbitration existed through the Roman Empire and the
Middle Ages; 25 2 by the turn of the twentieth century, various
nations had developed their own arbitration rules, 253 and
multinational treaties governing commercial arbitration had
already begun to appear.25 4 Like their counterparts today, drafters
certainly had a difficult road ahead to create a contemporary legal
framework for an international arbitration convention. Their
efforts resulted in the then-influential Geneva Protocol of 1923
and Geneva Convention of 1927.255
Thirty years later, drafters citing weaknesses in these
agreements helped draft the Convention.2 56  Experts at the time
recognized that "the 1927 Geneva Convention was a considerable
step forward, but it no longer entirely [met] modem economic
requirements." 257  Drafters had the fairly radical objective of
proposing a new international system of enforcement of arbitral
awards. 25 8  Not every nation was enthusiastic about the
Convention, as evidenced by the behavior of representatives from
the United States.259 Yet, the result was an influential convention
whose dominance in arbitration has extended for over five
decades. Professor van den Berg's proposal today stands at the
same crossroads as Sanders' proposal did over fifty years ago.
250 See Richard C. Reuben, Constitutional Gravity: A Unitary Theory ofAlternative
Dispute Resolution and Public Civil Justice, 47 UCLA L. REV. 949, 966 (2000).
251 See BORN, supra note 5, at 8.
252 See id. at 23-32.
253 See id. at 50-51.
254 See id. at 58.
255 See id. at 58-64.
256 See BORN, supra note 5, at 92-93.
257 Id. at 93 (citing Report and Preliminary Draft Convention adopted by the
Committee on International Commercial Arbitration at its Meeting of 13 March 1953,
reprinted in, 9(1) ICC Ct. Bull. 32 (1998)).
258 See BORN, supra note 5, at 93.
259 The U.S. delegation participated little in the drafting process and did not
recommend signing the New York Convention. See Alford, supra note 12, at 71-72;
Ramona Martinez, Comment, Recognition and Enforcement of International Arbitral
Awards Under the United Nations Convention of 1958: The "Refusal" Provisions, 24
INT'L L. 487, 491 (1990).
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There may be ambivalence by some and resistance by others, but
the road to revision is by no means an impassable one.
Finally, leaving the Convention's weaknesses unaddressed will
cause many problems to linger. The word "danger" may be too
strong, but retaining the status quo will only cause issues with the
Convention to fester. The enforcement of annulled awards is a
highly visible example. Some favor a more deferential approach
to the arbitral jurisdiction, while others perceive a broader ranging
role for enforcement courts.26 0 Courts have taken disparate
approaches as well, and the result has been divergent national
views regarding the interpretation of key provisions of the
Convention as applied to arbitral awards.2 6' This divergence
results in reduced international coordination and harmonization,
which firms rely on to keep the Convention effective and reliable.
Inaction will also delay resolution of future problems.
Inevitably, the environment of commercial arbitration in a decade
or two will be different than the one today's businesspeople face.
Issues arising during a drafting that is already in progress can be
more readily integrated into the new convention. Leaving the
Convention unrevised will only allow future issues to further
weaken the effectiveness of its provisions.
V. Conclusion
The Convention has had an impressive fifty-year run. Few
international agreements have been adopted by so many countries
and have delivered so many benefits to international commercial
enterprises. That being said, even the most illustrious of legal
documents may need updating on occasion. With the "golden
years" of the Convention's efficacy arguably behind us, 26 2 the time
has come to propose revisions and updates to this important
document.
While many provisions are in need of changes, one of the most
controversial and pressing problems is the enforcement of
260 Compare GHARAVI, supra note 78, at 76 passim (arguing against broad
enforcement of annulled awards), with Pengelley, supra note 117, at 195 (favoring a
more active approach for enforcement courts regarding annulled awards).
261 See e.g., GHARAVI, supra note 78, at 77-96.
262 See van den Berg, Proposed "New New York Convention ", supra note 184, at
21.
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annulled awards. Perhaps it was unthinkable at the time of the
Convention's drafting that non-situs courts would engage in so
much interference; however, the permissive language of Article V
to set aside awards, combined with the mandatory language of
Article VII to give parties greater local rights, has created division
and conflict across and within national jurisdictions. The
controversy has attracted the exploration of many scholars and
practitioners developing differences of opinion regarding which
judicial practice most effectively furthers the Convention's
goals.263
Professor van den Berg's proposal for a contemporary
Convention represents the most thoughtful and realistic proposal
to date. The proposed revisions update language where required,
clarify where ambiguity exists, and add new language that meets
the needs of a modem business environment. These actions are all
accomplished while maintaining the basic integrity of the current
Convention and sustaining its goal of encouraging the
implementation of arbitration and encouraging prompt
enforcement. These achievements are particularly compelling
regarding the enforcement of annulled awards. While not every
nation's representatives will likely hail the revision, the proposal
resolves much of the discord in commercial arbitration in favor of
respecting decisions of national courts in the arbitral situs within
the context of limited set aside provisions.
In spite of its merits, the revision has a long road ahead. No
doubt there will be further consultations, commentary, and
revisions to the proposed draft. Perhaps sometime in the near
future, while on a weekend visit to a relative, Professor van den
Berg or another enterprising expert will sit in a leafy suburban
garden and craft the final revision to this convention that will be
adopted by member states. The means might be a laptop rather
than a typewriter, but the result will likely be the same-a useful
and widely recognized Convention that efficiently and clearly
governs the substance and practice of international commercial
arbitration. Until then, rules governing enforcement of annulled
awards will remain discordant, confusing, and challenging to the
most important parties in arbitration-the enterprises that must
follow these rules while settling international commercial disputes.
263 See supra text accompanying notes 11-12.
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Appendix
Figure 1: A Comparison of the New York Convention (Article V)
and the van den Berg Revision (Article 5)264
New York Convention
Article V
Hypothetical Draft Convention
on the International
Enforcement of Arbitration
Agreements and Awards
Article 5 - Grounds for Refusal
of Enforcement
[No comparable provision] 1. Enforcement of an arbitral
award shall not be refused on
any ground other than the
grounds expressly set forth in
this article.
[No comparable provision] 2. Enforcement shall be refused
on the grounds set forth in this
article in manifest cases only.
1. Recognition and enforcement 3. Enforcement of an arbitral
of the award may be refused, at award shall be refused if, at the
the request of the party against request of the party against
whom it is invoked, only if that whom the award is invoked,
party furnishes the competent that party asserts and proves
authority where the recognition that:
and enforcement is sought,
prroof that:
(a) The parties to the agreement (a) there is no valid arbitration
referred to in article 11 were, agreement under the law of the
under the law applicable to country where the award was
them, under some incapacity, or made; or
the said agreement is not valid
under the law to which the
parties have subjected it or,
failing any indication thereon,
under the law of the country
where the award was made; or
264 Albert Jan van den Berg, A Closer Look at the New York Convention, 3 GLOBAL
ARB. REV. 14, 18-19 (2008).
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(b) The party against whom the (b) the party against whom the
award is invoked award is invoked
was not given proper notice of was not treated with equality or
the appointment was not given a
of the arbitrator or of the reasonable opportunity of
arbitration proceedings presenting its case; or
or was otherwise unable to
present his case; or
(c) The award deals with a (c) the relief granted in the
difference not contemplated by award is more than, or different
or not falling within the terms from, the relief sought in the
of the submission to arbitration, arbitration and such relief
or it contains decisions on cannot be severed from the
matters beyond the scope of the relief sought and granted; or
submission to arbitration,
provided that, if the
decisions on matters submitted
to arbitration can be separated
from those not so submitted,
that part of the award which
contains decisions on matters
submitted to arbitration may be
recognized and enforced; or
(d) The composition of the (d) the composition of the
arbitral authority or arbitral tribunal was not in
the arbitral procedure was not in accordance with the agreement
accordance of the parties, or in the absence
with the agreement of the of such an agreement, not in
parties, or, failing such accordance with the law of the
agreement, was not in country where the award was
accordance with the law made; or
of the country where the
arbitration took place; or
[See paragraph 1(d)] (e) the arbitral procedure was
not in accordance with the
agreement of the parties, or in
the absence of such an
agreement, not in accordance
with the law of the country
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| where the award was made; or
[See paragraph 1(e)] (g) the award has been set aside
by the court in the country
where the award was made on
grounds equivalent to grounds
(a) to (e) of this paragraph; or
2. Recognition and enforcement [See paragraph 4 below]
of an arbitral award may also be
refused if the competent
authority in the country where
recognition and
enforcement is sought finds
that:
(a) The subject matter of the [Subsumed in ground (h)
difference is not capable of below]
settlement by arbitration under
the law of that country; or
(b) The recognition or (h) enforcement of the award
enforcement of the award would would violate international
be contrary to the public policy public policy as prevailing in
of that country. the country where enforcement
is sought.
4. The court may on its own
motion refuse enforcement of
an arbitral award on ground (h)
of paragraph 3.
[No comparable provision] 5. The party against whom the
award is invoked cannot rely on
grounds (a) to (e) of paragraph
3
if that party has not raised them
in the arbitration without undue
delay after the moment when
the
existence of the ground became
known to that party.
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Figure 2: A Comparison of the New York Convention (Article
VII(1)) and the van den Berg Revision (Article 7)265
New York Convention Hypothetical Draft Convention
Article VII(1) on the International
Enforcement of Arbitration
Agreements and Awards
Article 7 - More-Favourable-
Right
1. The provisions of the present If an arbitration agreement or
Convention shall not affect the arbitral award can be enforced
validity of multilateral or on a legal basis other than this
bilateral agreements concerning Convention in the country
the recognition and where the agreement or award
enforcement of arbitral awards is invoked, a party seeking
entered into by the Contracting enforcement is allowed to rely
States nor deprive any on such basis.
interested party of any right he
may have to avail himself of an
arbitral award in the manner
and to the extent allowed by the
law or the treaties of the
country where such award is
sought to be relied upon.
265 Id. at 20.
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